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1. INTRODUCTION  
 Around the world, people face increasing responsibility for financial decisions that will 
directly impact their long term financial wellbeing  (Ryan et al. 2011). People with limited 
financial literacy confront complicated choices over credit, mortgages, investments, and 
retirement plans (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). In theory, the expert advice garnered from 
financial advisers should help consumers make sound decisions (Hackethal et al. 2012). 
However, empirical research shows that better outcomes are not guaranteed. While some papers 
show that advice improves portfolios, others find that financial advisers give poor counsel or 
bolster client’s biases or mistakes (Anagol et al. 2017; Bergstresser et al. 2009; Chalmers and 
Reuter 2015; Hackethal and Inderst 2013; Inderst and Ottaviani 2009, 2012a, b; Mullainathan et 
al. 2012). As a result, it is not surprising that people find it difficult to distinguish good advice 
from bad, and consequently, good advisers from bad advisers (Agnew et al. 2018). In this study, 
we take a deeper look at how and why clients’ evaluations of advisers evolve over time, and we 
also explore the monetary consequences of the behavioral biases that influence their assessments. 
New research demonstrates how easily advisers can manipulate consumers into following 
them by making good first impressions and confirming prior beliefs. However these studies do 
not address whether these actions have economic consequences nor do they identify the type and 
proportion of consumers who are most susceptible to these strategies (Agnew et al. 2018). 
Therefore, the magnitude of this phenomenon and whether, in turn, this is a cause for concern is 
not clear. Using new experimental data and adapting a new theoretical learning model, this paper 
addresses these important unanswered questions. It also contributes to the literature by 
highlighting the widespread and significant economic role first impressions and confirmation 
bias can play in the financial advice market. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to measure 
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how these biases can evolve over time and transform a consumer’s willingness to pay for 
advisers.  
Our study implements and tests the limited memory learning model in a new, financial 
context. Until now, the learning model has only been tested using experiments that examine how 
participants interpret information about two policy issues. In our study, clients must learn about 
the quality of the advisers through the quality of the advice given. Our results show that the 
limited memory model can explain features of financial decisions that conventional models 
cannot, such as the persistent and unwarranted trust that some clients place in financial advisers 
(ASIC 2012; Mullainathan et al. 2012).   
The paper is structured as follows. We begin this paper in Section 2 by discussing 
learning models and their relationship to confirmation bias. Section 3 follows with a description 
of the market for financial advice. Section 4 presents a formal model drawn from Fryer et al. 
(forthcoming) that incorporates confirmation bias and compares it to a rational updating model. 
Section 5 presents our experimental design. Our empirical results are highlighted in Section 6 
followed by a discussion of the findings in Section 7 to conclude the paper. 
 
2. CONSUMER LEARNING AND CONFIRMATION BIAS 
Consumers frequently make decisions with incomplete information. As a result, learning is 
best understood not as a simple collection of knowledge, but as a hypothesis-testing process 
where new information is encoded and integrated with existing beliefs (Hoch and Deighton 
1989). A prime example is when clients have to decide whether to follow financial advice in an 
area where they have little experience, such as how to invest retirement savings. Clients who 
have incomplete information will usually rely on signals to reach a decision about the quality of 
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an adviser. For example, clients might rely on an adviser’s professional certification, consider 
advice given on a different topic from the adviser before, or rely on other people’s opinions of 
the quality of the different advisers. All of these signals help clients form an initial belief. New 
signals and added experience then help them update these beliefs until they can make better-
informed decisions. The need to update beliefs formed with incomplete information is common 
to many situations, such as when consumers purchase for the first time in an unknown product 
category, when voters choose between two political candidates, when doctors have to choose 
between two alternative treatments, or, as in the example above, when clients have to decide 
whether to continue to trust their financial advisers.   
People, however, rarely update their beliefs in a rational way. Instead they tend to interpret 
evidence “in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” 
(Nickerson 1998) and tend to search harder for information that confirms their beliefs 
(Muthukrishnan 1995; Snyder and Swann 1978),  labelled “confirmation bias”. Confirmation 
bias has proven to be a robust phenomenon in areas as diverse as beliefs about the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty, nuclear power generation, climate change, brand loyalty and sexual 
morality (see Fryer et al. forthcoming, Online Appendix C, Table 1, for a summary). 
Confirmation bias is often founded on a first impression (Beattie and Baron 1988) and also 
explains how two people can reach opposite opinions after they review common evidence 
(Darley and Gross 1983). The defining feature of this bias is that additional information leads to 
the polarization, rather than the moderation, of prior opinions.  
Confirmation bias cannot be incorporated into traditional models because it violates a 
basic assumption of conventional Bayesian learning (Eckstein et al. 1988; Erdem and Keane 
1996; Roberts and Urban 1988). Where a rational Bayesian learner would ignore ambiguous new 
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information, confirmation bias causes the learner to interpret ambiguous new information as a 
reinforcement of prior beliefs. Thus in contrast to learning models that allow people to give 
higher weight to new signals from specific sources (Camacho et al. 2011), learning under 
confirmation bias not only leads to different weighting of signals, but actually can reverse the 
interpretation of the signal. Irrespective of the actual signal valence, a person with confirmation 
bias will treat an ambiguous signal as positive if their prior belief is positive, and will treat it as 
negative if their prior belief is negative. Such a biased updating in turn leads to overconfidence 
so that people may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an 
infinite amount of information (Rabin and Schrag 1999).  
In this paper, we investigate whether a learning model that allows for confirmation bias 
performs better than a rational model that does not. Specifically, we focus on how individuals 
judge their financial adviser over time based on the advice given to them. We believe that 
confirmation bias is likely to be more relevant to services such as financial advice, where 
consumers are not always able to objectively judge quality. 
 
3. THE MARKET FOR FINANCIAL ADVICE 
 
The market for financial advice is growing as households face new and difficult choices. 
“Do-it-yourself” finance is the term Ryan et al. (2011) coined to describe the increased 
responsibility untrained or inexperienced people have been given for financial decisions. There is 
ample evidence that people frequently make poor financial decisions when deciding on these 
new and more complicated products (Campbell et al. 2011). Reasons for these errors include low 
levels of financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011), issues of trust in markets and financial 
products (Christelis et al. 2010), behavioral biases (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) and limited 
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cognition (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Opportunities to learn from experience in financial 
contexts are limited because many consequential decisions, such as the choice of a mortgage or 
retirement account investment, are made infrequently, and feedback from outcomes is often 
delayed. Financial firms may have incentives to make products more complex to impede 
consumer learning and preserve profits (Carlin 2009; Carlin and Manso 2010). Financial choices, 
and the mistakes that often follow, have serious implications for financial welfare and stability, 
individually and in aggregate (Agarwal et al. 2009; Bar-Gill and Warren 2008; Campbell 2006; 
Campbell et al. 2011).   
Consumers can delegate difficult decisions to financial advisers to compensate for low 
financial literacy and lack of expertise (Hackethal et al. 2012). However, theory predicts that an 
adviser’s willingness to de-bias and educate clients can be diluted by incentive structures (e.g. 
Inderst and Ottaviani 2009). Empirical studies likewise show that advisers can exploit the biases 
of clients (Hackethal et al. 2012; Mullainathan et al. 2012) and that clients credulously continue 
to trust advisers who deliver poor quality advice (Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission 2012) (ASIC 2012). In a recent study, Agnew et al. (2018) illustrate how much first 
impressions in the client-adviser relationship matter, complementing research that shows that 
clients form opinions of their financial advisers rapidly (Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000). Together, 
these findings explain how some advisers can successfully use strategies to build and maintain 
client trust while also providing unhelpful advice (Anagol et al. 2017; Mullainathan et al. 2012). 
Experimental work also shows that advisers who confirm a client’s views on straightforward 
questions early in an advice relationship are subsequently rated as more trustworthy and 
competent than advisers who contradict a client’s views. Furthermore, clients are more likely to 
accept their later advice on complicated topics (Agnew et al. 2018). Thus, establishing trust early 
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on can lead to fruitful business interactions subsequently. More trusted advisers are likely to be 
able to charge higher fees and thus take a larger share of the benefits of the advice relationship 
(Gennaioli et al. 2015).  
Despite these hazards, citizens of many countries use advice services. For example, 
Chater et al. (2010) report that 58% of individual investors’ stock purchases were influenced by 
an adviser, in a survey of 6,000 consumers across eight EU countries. Holden et al. (2013) find 
that people choose to work with advisers because the advisers have expertise in an area that their 
clients do not. Other studies emphasize that the personal qualities of advisers matter; for 
example, clients must decide if an adviser is trustworthy and competent before acting on advice. 
Georgarakos and Inderst (2014) show that clients with limited financial capability are more 
likely to follow advice if they trust their advisers, but trust depends on many factors, including 
the client’s capability, the accuracy and quality of information provided, and a belief that the 
adviser and client’s incentives are aligned (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001; Yaniv and Kleinberger 
2000).  
In summary, people are facing challenging new financial choices and may not have the 
financial knowledge or experience to make sound decisions. Those who turn to advisers for help 
cannot be certain of getting the best advice, yet they still must form beliefs about advisers’ 
quality using the signals they receive from them. Prior beliefs about advisers’ quality will depend 
on client and adviser characteristics; these beliefs could also influence a client’s interpretation of 
subsequent signals from the advisers. Clients who process information in a limited or biased way 
are less likely to reach sound judgements about the quality of an adviser.  
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4. A MODEL OF CONFIRMATION BIAS 
Learning under confirmation bias 
While confirmation bias and the polarization of opinion that follows is at odds with 
standard Bayesian updating models, it can be explained by updating models with the form of 
limited memory introduced in Fryer et al. (forthcoming). Consider a rational Bayesian decision 
maker who may or may not be able to discern the state of the world, in our case the quality of a 
financial adviser. Assume that the decision maker, here the “client” forms an expectation over 
the two states of the world: 𝐴𝐴 (the adviser is good), and 𝐵𝐵 (the adviser is bad). The client holds 
an initial prior (or starting) belief that P(A)=λ0, which they update as they receive a sequence of 
clear or ambiguous signals from an adviser.1  We can interpret this starting belief as the client’s 
initial belief about the adviser. The client receives a clear good (𝑎𝑎) or bad (𝑏𝑏) signal of the 
adviser’s quality in the form of a correct or incorrect recommendation from the financial adviser. 
The signal (recommendation) may either agree with, or contradict, what the client thinks is 
factual or sound. The client uses clear signals to update their prior belief and form a posterior 
expectation of the state of the world, i.e., of the quality of the adviser. Let s>1/2 denote the 
probability the client receives a clear, good signal conditional on the adviser being good, 
P(𝑎𝑎│𝐴𝐴)=𝑠𝑠, and assume that the probability of receiving a clear, good signal from a bad adviser is 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎│𝐵𝐵)=1−𝑠𝑠. The parameter s determines how much the beliefs of the client are influenced by 
the signal, and therefore s can be interpreted as signal strength. 
However, the client may also receive an ambiguous signal ab. In our context, an 
ambiguous signal might be a recommendation on a topic where the client is inexperienced or 
                                                     
1 We note that Fryer et al (forthcoming) in their general model additionally allow for signals Ø that contain no 
information. Since the financial advice we evaluate here in this study is inherently good or bad we do not allow for 
empty signals. 
10 
 
 
 
uninformed. Ambiguous signals create an opportunity for confirmation bias to operate. Rational 
Bayesian updaters ignore ambiguous signals and forms a posterior only over the sequence of 
clear signals. They thus gradually uncover the true state of the world. However, when updaters 
have a confirmation bias, they will not overlook an ambiguous signal. Rather they will interpret 
the ambiguous signal in line with their current belief, either as 𝑎𝑎 or 𝑏𝑏, and thus reinforce their 
existing view of the state of the world. Fryer et al. (forthcoming) show that limited memory – the 
need to form a posterior belief on receipt of each signal rather than wait to the end of the 
sequence - forces an interpretation of ambiguous signals that generate confirmation bias and 
polarization of opinions.  
More formally, in the rational model, beliefs are updated according to 
 (1)
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where tσ  is the advice received in choice situation t (t=1,…, T), that is, the signal. When a 
limited memory updater (Fryer et al., forthcoming, hereafter FHJ) holds a prior belief that the 
adviser is good quality, he or she interprets an ambiguous signal as a good signal, and as a bad 
signal when he or she holds a prior that the adviser is poor quality. In the limited memory (FHJ) 
updating model, the client’s beliefs are updated according to: 
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 In our experimental application, discussed in detail in Section 5, clients view 
professionally filmed videos of two advisers giving advice on four different advice topics. (Table 
1 shows the scripts of the advice.) The sequence of the topics and the quality of the advice given 
by each adviser varies by experimental treatment. The videos are adapted from the Agnew et al. 
(2018) experiment and the signals are the advice given.2 Clients perceive each piece of advice 
given by each adviser as ambiguous or clear, and as good or bad. For each topic, the adviser 
either provides an unequivocally right or wrong piece of advice based on financial theory but the 
quality of that advice may not be apparent to all clients, depending on their financial knowledge 
and experience. For example, for those with strong financial literacy, the advice given by each 
adviser should provide clear signals of the adviser’s quality. However, for clients with limited 
financial literacy or experience with the topic, some of the advice signals may be ambiguous. 
The experimental design in this paper includes four advice topics from Agnew et al. (2018) and 
six previously untested sequences of good/bad advice. The order in which we present topics to 
experimental participants (clients), combined with the order in which each adviser gives either 
good or bad advice creates a test of 24 sequences of signals of adviser quality for each of two 
advisers, or a total of 48 sequences. The new variations in the advice sequences allow us to 
observe, for the first time, whether participants update their beliefs about an adviser in a 
conventionally rational way or with limited memory.  
INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 illustrates all possible paths of beliefs for the experimental “clients” under 
different assumptions about initial priors and updating strategies (in rows). Given a client’s 
initial prior beliefs and updating strategy, each path depends on how many advice topics were 
                                                     
2 To view an example of the video advice from a treatment in Agnew (2018), please follow this link 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-1NMLVfExG1ZzFhZWlrRWlsR2s/preview . 
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perceived by the client as clear, and in which choice sets advice on the clear topics was given (in 
columns, ranging from all topics perceived as clear to all topics perceived as ambiguous). The 
size of the dots reflects the theoretical proportion of all possible choice patterns that pass through 
the respective point. We arbitrarily set the probability that a good adviser offers a good signal, s, 
to 0.75. Rows 1, 3 and 4 reflect FHJ updating with starting priors λ0 of 0.6, 0.5, and 0.4, 
respectively. Row 2 is based on rational updating with starting prior λ0 equal to 0.5.  
INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
For example, consider, the first column of graphs, where we assume that all topics are 
clear to the client. Differences between paths thus only come from differences in the sequence of 
good and bad advice that one adviser gives the client over four topics. If all topics are clear, and 
if all clients have the same starting prior, rational and FHJ updating methods lead to the same 
posterior beliefs (see column 1, rows 2 and 3). When moving to the next column of graphs, we 
can see that if one topic is ambiguous, FHJ updating leads to deviations from the rationally 
updated priors and polarization. The polarization becomes more pronounced as clients perceive 
more topics to be ambiguous (columns further right), and becomes extreme when they perceive 
all four topics to be ambiguous: FHJ updating clients reach an almost certain belief that the 
adviser is good if they start with an initial prior larger than 0.5 (column 5, row 1) and reach an 
almost certain belief that the adviser is bad if they start with a prior smaller than 0.5 (column 5, 
row 4). Rational clients do not update their priors if all signals are ambiguous (column 5, row 2).  
FHJ updaters also do not update when all signals are ambiguous and their starting prior is equal 
to 0.5 (row 3, column 5).   
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Model Description 
In this section, we describe how confirmation bias can be calibrated and linked to contextual 
variables using information on a client’s sequence of choices of as well as his or her willingness 
to pay.  
Assume a client k, =1,…, K,  receives a sequence of tk=1,…, Tk signals 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
from two different sources (advisers) labeled R and L. We assume that the signals 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  and 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
received in choice set tk are either both clear or both ambiguous to the client, k. In our case, the 
sequence represents the choice sets, the signals are advice on a financial topic, and the sources of 
the signals are financial advisers. We further assume that (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) ∈ {(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏), (𝑏𝑏,𝑎𝑎), (𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏,𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏)}, 
where from the perspective of the client, a is a clear signal of good quality, b is a clear signal of 
bad quality, and ab is an ambiguous signal. In each choice set: i) one adviser gives good advice 
and the other provides bad advice; ii) the client interprets the advice as either ambiguous or clear; 
iii) the client chooses between the two sources based on their interpretation of the quality of the 
signal. Thus, in our experiment, the client (k) chooses whether to follow the advice (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) of adviser R or L provided in choice set t. We code the choice data as 
(3) 
1, if was chosen at choice  by client ,
0, if was chosen at choice  by client .
k
kt
k
R t k
y
L t k

= 

  
Further, assume that after having received T signals from each adviser, the client can 
choose to purchase an additional unit from each adviser at a certain price kp . In our example, we 
ask participants whether they would be willing to pay a particular amount for a one-hour session 
with the adviser. Let Lky  (
R
ky ) be indicator variables, taking the value 1 if L (R) is chosen by 
decision maker k in this context3. 
                                                     
3 Note that the model can be extended to include more entities or more attributes to influence the different choices. 
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Equations (1) and (2) describe how clients update their beliefs depending on whether they 
are Bayesian rational decision makers, or whether they are prone to confirmation bias, 
respectively. Which updating scheme a particular client uses is not known by the researcher and 
needs to be inferred from the observed choices. Similarly, in many cases, the researcher does not 
know whether a signal is clear or ambiguous to the decision maker and must make inferences 
about this from the choice data.  
In both updating schemes, the posterior belief (or updated prior) depends on the initial 
prior belief 0
r
kλ (or starting prior) over adviser { , }r R L∈  of the decision maker k.  The starting 
prior itself depends on the characteristics of the advisers { , }r R L∈  and the decision maker, 0X  
(see Table 2 for a description of the variables used in our empirical example) and an unknown 
vector of parameters 0β . So that we can estimate this parameter, we make the starting prior 
probability of adviser quality to be a logit function of features of the adviser and the client:  
(4) 0 00
0 0
exp( )
1 exp( )
r
k
X
X
β
λ
β
=
+
  
When combined with a value for signal strength, s, we can calculate rkjλ , the updated prior 
about adviser { , }r R L∈  of decision maker k after choice set j, conditional on the client’s 
updating scheme and signal clarity based on Equations (1) and (2).4 
INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE 
We also infer from choice data and survey responses which type of updating scheme the 
client uses and which topics are ambiguous or clear to him or her. If the client perceives the 
signal to be clear (i.e., the topic is easy for them), we assume that he or she will choose the 
                                                     
4 To enable us to identify parameters, we set s to an arbitrary value greater than 0.5 and check sensitivity of 
estimation to alternative choices. The results we report below use s=0.75. 
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source that gives a high-quality signal in this choice set (i.e., the adviser who gives correct 
advice). That is, if the topic is clear, the client chooses the advice based on its quality alone. 
However, if the client perceives the signal to be ambiguous (i.e., the topic is hard and the client 
cannot distinguish good from bad advice), we assume that the client will make the choice in this 
choice set according to his or her posterior belief about the source, in our case, based on 
posterior beliefs about the advisers’ qualities.  
We denote ( , )trkq a b∈  as the quality associated with signal rtσ  that decision maker k 
receives. We further define tkq   equal to 1 if 
t
Rkq a= and -1 otherwise.  We acknowledge that 
decision makers still make some errors when choosing and that this error is extreme value 
distributed with scale 11/ β  and 21/ β , respectively, and thus obtain 
(5) 1
1
exp( )( 1| =clear)
1 exp( )
t
k
kt tk t
k
qP y
q
β
σ
β
= =
+
  
and 
(6) 2
2
exp( ·( ))( 1| =ambiguous) .
1 exp( ·( ))
R L
kt kt
kt tk R L
kt kt
P y β λ λσ
β λ λ
−
= =
+ −
  
Thus both 1β  and 2β  are scale parameters: as 1β  ( 2β  ) approaches infinity, the 
expression in the right hand side approaches 1 for jkq =1 (
R L
kt ktλ λ> ), and 0 otherwise. 
Next we turn to the client’s willingness to pay. The client can choose to pay for an 
additional unit from each adviser (i.e. advice from both, one, or none of the advisers). We model 
this choice as follows:  
(7) 
1 2
3 3 3
1
3 3 3
0
0
3
3
2
)
)
exp((willing to pay for ) ,
1 exp(
r
kT
r
kT
XP r
X
β β λ β
β β λ β
+ +
=
+ + +
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where 3X  are attributes of the client and r, including the price of another unit of the R or L, 
0
3β  is 
a constant, 13β  captures the impact of the posterior on the willingness to pay, and 
2
3β  is a vector of 
unknown parameters. 
Summarizing, in our specification, clients’ sequences of choices, including their 
decisions to pay for another round of advice, are functions of posterior beliefs about r. These 
posterior beliefs are, in turn, a function of the way clients update their beliefs (either rationally or 
with confirmation bias) and of which signals clients perceive to be clear (i.e., which topics are 
easy to them). Our model assigns clients to latent classes distinguished by clarity or ambiguity of 
the signals in choice set tk and to latent classes distinguished by their updating scheme. In the 
interest of parsimony, we assume that the probability that a client is a particular updating type 
and the probability that a client treats any topic as clear are independent, conditioning on the 
characteristics of the individual client, so that:5 
(8) clarity rationality clarity rationality( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ),k k k kP P P Pτ τ τ τ τ= =   
and  
(9) clarity
1
( ) ( clear).
k
k
T
k k tk
t
P Pτ σ
=
= =∏   
Dependence between the latent classes for any client k is captured by allowing class 
membership probabilities to be influenced by client-specific covariates X4 and X5 and associated 
parameter vectors 4β , 5β , and signal specific constants 5
tkβ , with ' '5 5
tk t kβ β=  for tk t kσ σ ′ ′=  :    
(10) 4 4
4 4
exp( )( ) ,
1 exp( )ratio alk n
XP
X
β
τ
β
=
+
  
                                                     
5 Note that in our empirical example without any further assumptions there exist two types of updaters as well as a 
classification of clear or ambiguous for each of four topics, which results in 2^5=32 different combinations. 
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and  
(11) 5 5 5
5 5 5
exp( )( clear) .
1 exp( )
tk
k kt tk
XP
X
β β
σ
β β
+
= =
+ +
  
 
We estimate the parameters { }0 1 2 4 5, , , ,β β β βθ β=  by jointly maximizing the likelihood 
of choices and willingness to pay decisions. Conditional on the client belonging to one of the C 
clarity-rationality class combinations cτ  , c=1,…,C, the likelihood of client k’s sequence of 
choices is  
(12) 1 1 1
1
( | ) ( 1| ) (willing to pay for entity | ) (willing to pay for entity | ) .
R L
kt k k
k
T
y y y
k c kt c c c
t
l P y P R P Lθ τ τ τ τ= = =
=
= =∏
The unconditional likelihood of client k’s sequence of choices is thus: 
(13) 
1
( ) ( ) ( | ).
C
k k c k c
c
l P lθ τ θ τ
=
=∑   
 
Parameter identification 
A formal analysis of identification is not feasible for the complex, non-linear learning 
model discussed above  (see also the discussion in Ching et al. 2013). In the following, we sketch 
our identification strategy for the key model parameters. 
First, consider the initial prior belief about r, which is the starting prior 0
r
kλ . The starting 
prior belief is the basis for the updated posterior belief and thus influences both the choices of r 
as well as willingness to pay. The starting prior belief itself also influences directly the choices 
made in choice set 1, as in this set we assume that (up to uncertainty) the adviser (source) with 
the higher initial prior is chosen if the topic is ambiguous. Since the design of the experiment 
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(discussed in Section 5 and described in Table 3) ensures that participants (clients) face both 
easy as well as hard (ambiguous) signals in choice set 1 (refer to panel B in Table 3), we thus 
obtain sufficient information to estimate the starting prior as well as how it depends on advisers’ 
r and decision maker’s characteristics ( 1β  ).  
INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE 
Next we discuss the signal strength s=Pr (𝑎𝑎│𝐴𝐴) = Pr(b│B) , which in our empirical 
application is the probability that a good (bad) signal comes from a good (bad) adviser. We set 
s=0.75 to allow the probability to be greater than 0.5 but less than one that a good adviser 
delivers good advice, to ensure that updating can occur. We test for the sensitivity of results at 
s=0.60 and results remain largely unchanged. 
The parameter 2β   is in turn identified via the starting prior 0
r
kλ  and s. These two 
parameters jointly define the updated beliefs and can thus be considered as pre-determined 
covariates when participants face an ambiguous topic. Choices made in choice sets with 
ambiguous signals can thus identify 2β  .  
Choices made over the different choice sets allow us to identify the latent “clarity 
classes.” More specifically, our assumption about the choice process can (up to uncertainty in the 
choice process) be summarized as follows. If we observe that the client chooses the adviser that 
gives a bad quality signal, we can conclude that the signal was ambiguous for him or her. We 
cannot make a similar inference if the client chooses the adviser that gives a good quality signal, 
as this could imply either that the signal was clear for that client or that they chose the adviser 
because of a higher associated posterior belief. The combined information of updated prior 
beliefs about the advisers and incorrect choices of advice thus allows us to identify what we call 
clarity classes. 
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Since the starting prior belief about the adviser can be inferred from the data without any 
assumptions about how clients update their beliefs and since signal strength s is fixed, we can 
calculate the posteriors for both updating schemes. The posterior associated with the higher 
likelihood then helps to pin down rationality classes.  
 
Discontinuity of the likelihood function and estimation method 
Estimation of our model is complicated by the fact that the likelihood function is 
discontinuous for those cases where participants update their beliefs according to the FHJ 
updating scheme. The discontinuity in the likelihood appears along the dimensions of the 
parameters of prior beliefs. Even in the simplest case when the starting prior belief is represented 
by a single constant (as illustrated in Figure 2), as this constant moves from zero to one and 
crosses particular thresholds dependent on other parameters, the values and the counts of the 
possible updated prior beliefs change discontinuously.  
INSERT Figure 2 ABOUT HERE 
 Figure 2 compares the updated prior beliefs 4λ  (after a sequence of four choices has been made) 
under the rational and FHJ updating for three values of the signal strength parameter s as the 
starting prior 0λ  changes from zero to one. For each value of the starting prior 0λ  we draw all 
values of posterior beliefs that are possible in the model (by assuming all possible clarity and 
quality combinations of signals), with the size of the circles indicating the number of theoretical 
paths leading to that belief. For example, in row 1 and column 2, at a signal strength of s=0.75 
and where all participants use FHJ updating, we see that a small change in the prior belief from 
0.49 to 0.51 results in large differences in the posterior: for a prior of 0.49 most posteriors are 
smaller than 0.1, while at a prior of 0.51 most posteriors are larger than 0.8. Since both the prior 
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as well as the posterior beliefs influence the likelihood function, a small change in the prior can 
thus lead to a huge - and discontinuous - change in the likelihood function. We use Sequential 
Adaptive Bayesian Learning (SABL) proposed by Durham and Geweke (2014) to overcome this 
challenge and estimate the model. Appendix A provides a further discussion of the discontinuity 
problem and outlines the estimation procedure. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We designed our experiment to achieve two goals. First, we aimed to collect data to 
estimate and compare a model of client confirmation bias (FHJ) with a model of rational 
(standard Bayesian) choice. Second, we aimed to measure the participants’ willingness to pay for 
advice and how it is affected by confirmation bias. Since clients who lack experience or financial 
literacy are probably more susceptible to manipulation, we also collect an array of demographics, 
preferences, financial capability measures, and psychological inventories to help identify these 
clients.  
We fielded a four-part online survey that included an incentivized choice experiment in 
December 2014.6 Members of a nationally representative online panel were invited to complete 
the survey. Those who responded to the invitation had to pass two screening questions to meet 
age and gender quotas. This resulted in 2,003 “clients”. To ensure incentive compatibility, we 
compensated participants who completed the experiment for their time and rewarded them if 
they chose correct advice in each choice set and in a post experiment quiz. Participants first 
answered a set of questions that measured their general financial literacy and numeracy (Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2011; Lipkus et al. 2001), and that evaluated their understanding and experience of 
                                                     
6 The survey offered participants who completed all questions a small compensation for their time (around $4) and 
one entry in a prize draw for $A50 for each correct choice of advice.  
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the participants of the four advice topics covered by advisers in the subsequent discrete choice 
experiment (DCE).  
Our DCE offers “clients” a sequence of videos of advisers who give financial advice on 
four common and important consumer finance topics.7 The topics include credit card debt 
repayment, retirement savings account consolidation, diversification in equity investment, and 
index fund fees. Table 1 records the scripts for the good and bad advice for each topic.   
To identify the effect of confirmation bias in the DCE, we ensured advice topics, 
advisers, the environment and the mode of advice delivery to be uniform. Figure 3 shows the 
advisers from the videos and their “names”. The videos allow us to control the two advisers 
shown to each participant, the order of advice topics, the quality of advice given by each adviser 
for each topic and the attributes of advisers giving advice.  
INSERT Figure 3 ABOUT HERE 
In the DCE videos, two advisers give a recommendation on each of the four topics: each 
participant received four pairs of advice; the two advisers were the same across the four advice 
topics for each participant; and in each case, one adviser provided a correct recommendation, 
while the other provided an incorrect recommendation. Correct and incorrect advice hereafter is 
termed “good” and “bad” in line with the description of the method in the previous section. The 
videos systematically varied adviser factors - the adviser’s gender (2 options: male or female) 
and age (2 options: young or old), professional certification (2 options: certification presented or 
not) - the order of the advice topics (4 options: first, second, third, or fourth) and the quality of 
the advice (2 options: correct or incorrect).  
                                                     
7 The topics were previously used by Agnew et al. (2018) based on their relevance for people around the world, that 
they had unequivocally right and wrong answers and were based on the mistakes often made in these areas. 
22 
 
 
 
The experiment used a between-subjects design. As noted, the advice viewed by any one 
participant is provided by the same two advisers; hence, variation in adviser factors (age, gender, 
certification) is a between-subjects manipulation. To minimize the between-subjects treatment 
groups, we used a fold-over design in which we created the 2^3 complete factorial of possible 
advisers and paired each of them with their “mirror image” (that is, the exact opposite level, so 
that a younger woman adviser was matched with an older male adviser). This produced pairs of 
advisers who were orthogonal in the differences in factor levels. The resulting design is 
optimally efficient under the assumption that a conditional multinomial logit choice model 
underlies the participant choices (Street et al. 2005; Street and Burgess 2007). This design 
approach produced four between-subject treatment groups and is shown in panel A of Table 3. 
Further variation in the DCE relates to between-subject manipulation of a) topic sequence 
and b) order in which good and bad advice is given by each adviser. Variation in these orders is 
essential to test hypotheses about formation of persistent participant preferences for advisers. 
The fold-over design used to create the between-subjects manipulations ensures variation in 
quality of advice. We also maximized variation in adviser attributes by ensuring that both 
financial advisers gave advice on the same topic in each pair. Thus, we combined the between-
subjects treatment groups (4) with a design to vary the orders of topics (4 levels) and good and 
bad advice (2 levels). A full factorial design would have required a very complex survey 
program and a very large sample, since it implies 16 possible sequences of good (G) and bad (B) 
advice and 24 possible sequences of topics. To maximize variation and to enable a test of 
confirmation bias we used six sequences of good and bad advice orders – those where each 
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adviser gives two good and two bad recommendations (see panel C of Table 3) - and topic 
sequences with an equal number of hard and easy financial topics (see panel B of Table 3).8 
When we combined the four possible pairs of advisers with the six possible sequences of 
topics and the six possible sequences of advice quality, we obtained a design with 6*6*4 =144 
conditions. We randomly assigned at least 10 and up to 14 participants to each condition. 
After the DCE task, participants rated the trustworthiness, competence, attractiveness, 
understanding, professionalism, financial expertise, genuineness and persuasiveness of the 
advisers they saw, and stated their willingness to pay $X for a one-hour session with both, one or 
none of the advisers. We assigned to participants fixed fee values 
{ }50,100,150,250,500,750X ∈  so as to minimize their predictability from the other 
manipulated characteristics of the experiment condition. After they had answered questions 
about demographics (e.g., marital status, household size and number of dependents, education, 
labor market status, income, gross assets, and debts/liabilities) and personal characteristics, 
including personality traits and risk attitudes, participants read debriefing information that 
explained correct advice. The survey closed with an incentivized quiz on the debriefing 
material.9  
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In aggregate, participants chose correct recommendations 79% of the time. The 
percentages of correct choices by topic are 86% for retirement account consolidation, 88% for 
                                                     
8 We rely on the results by Agnew et al (2018) who find that two topics (debt repayment and retirement account 
consolidation) are relatively easy (E) and that the other two topics (diversification and index fund fees) are relatively 
hard (H). 
9 Appendix A compares the characteristics of the sample with the Australian Census data from 2011. Our sample 
reports slightly higher educational attainments and a higher probability of being married than the census shows, but 
otherwise is representative of the population. 
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credit card debt repayment, 79% for stock diversification and 64% for index fund fees. 
Participants chose the advice of the young female adviser two percentage points more often than 
the advice of the older male who appears alongside her in the experiment. Participants chose the 
younger male and older female equally often. On average, participants were also more likely to 
choose the certified adviser (52%) than the uncertified adviser (48%), illustrating the importance 
of an initial good impression. The fact that this difference was smaller for the “easy topics” 
(retirement account consolidation and credit card debt repayment; 2.6%), than for the “hard 
topics” (stock diversification and index fund fees; 5%), indicates that beliefs about the adviser 
are more important if the signal quality is ambiguous. 
We estimated our model using data from 1,903 of the 2,003 participants and held back 
the remaining responses to assess hold-out fit. In-sample fit was satisfactory and hold-out fit did 
not deviate very much from in-sample fit, which shows that our model does not over-fit the data: 
The model predicted an average (over all choice sets) probability of 0.69 for the estimation 
sample that the adviser who was in fact chosen would be chosen, and it predicted a related 
probability of 0.69 for the hold out sample. When the adviser was not chosen, the predicted 
choice probability decreased to 0.29 for the estimation sample, whereas it decreased to 0.28 for 
the hold-out sample. The predicted probabilities were less discriminating in the willingness to 
pay choice probabilities. When a participant chose to pay the adviser, the model’s average 
predicted probability was 0.48 for the estimation sample data and 0.44 for the hold-out data. 
When a participant chose not to pay the adviser, the average predicted probability of being paid 
was 0.28 for the estimation sample data and 0.34 for the hold-out sample data. Thus, the model 
slightly underestimates the probability that a participant is willing to pay the proposed fee for the 
adviser.  
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We also compared our model to a model that assumes pure rational updating (where
( )ratk ionalP τ =1 for all k), in line with traditional learning models. The logmarginal density for this 
restricted model is -5887.17 compared to a logmarginal density of -5827.47 for our proposed 
model for in-sample fit, and -305.62 versus -298.35 for hold-out sample fit, thus demonstrating 
that accounting for confirmation bias significantly improves model fit. Indeed, as also discussed 
further below, 63% of participants update their beliefs in a way that is not consistent with 
rational Bayesian updating, which leads to both polarized choice probabilities as well as 
willingness to pay estimate.  
Table 4 reports the model estimates.  For each parameter, we report the mode of its 
posterior distribution as well as the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of this distribution, that is, the 
corresponding equi-tailed credible interval (CI). There is a 95% probability that the parameter is 
not zero if zero does not fall in the CI. Next, we discuss each of the model components. 
INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Prior belief about adviser 
We allow the starting prior belief about an adviser’s quality to depend on the trust that a 
participant has in financial advisers (Guiso et al. 2008) and also whether the adviser displayed a 
professional certification in the experiment (Agnew et al. 2018). Both factors have been shown 
by earlier studies to influence whether people will take financial advice. The mode of the 
distribution for the trust parameter equals 0.520, and the 95% credible interval does not contain 
zero. This shows that participants who rate financial advisers as trustworthy hold a higher prior 
belief that the adviser is good, as we would expect. The mode of the distribution for the non-
certification parameter equals -0.085 and the 95% CI again does not contain zero. Based on the 
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posterior draws of the parameters (not reported here), we can infer the distribution of the 
difference in prior beliefs for certified versus uncertified advisers. From the perspective of 
participants who trust financial advisers already (“Trust in advisers” variable =1), this posterior 
distribution has a mean of 0.016 with an associated 95% CI of [0.001, 0.036]. For participants 
who generally distrust financial advisers (“Trust in advisers” variable =-1), the impact of 
certification is double: this posterior distribution has a mean of 0.032 with a 95% CI of [0.003, 
0.073]. The mean of the posterior for participants who are neutral about financial advisers 
(“Trust in advisers” variable =0) is 0.023 [0.002, 0.054]. We infer that if an adviser displays a 
professional certification, participants form a significantly higher prior belief that he or she will 
give good advice and this higher expectation will be subsequently reflected in higher choice 
probabilities in the case of ambiguous topics and higher willingness to pay for additional advice 
from this adviser. Certification has a stronger influence on participants who are generally 
skeptical of adviser quality. This is in line with the findings by Agnew et al. (2018) who show 
that displaying a certification significantly increases an adviser’s likelihood of having this or her 
advice accepted by a client. 
 
Choice of advice 
Participants’ ability to choose good advice depends on the clarity of the topic. In the case of easy 
topics, the participant will choose the good advice (up to some error, equation (5)). In the case of 
hard topics, equation (6) posits that (up to some error) participants will choose the adviser they 
rate as better, according to participants’ updated (posterior) beliefs. The parameters associated 
with both the quality of the advice and the belief about the adviser are positive, equaling 4.138 
and 2.663, respectively, and the 95% credible intervals based on their posterior distributions do 
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not include zero. This translates into the following choice probabilities: the probability that the 
participant chooses good advice if the topic is easy equals exp / 1 ex(4.296) ( (4.296) 9p ) 0. 9+ = ; 
if the topic is ambiguous, the probability of an adviser R with associated belief 1Rλ =  being 
chosen when being evaluated against an adviser L with associated belief 0Lλ =  is 
exp · / 1 ex(2.510 (1 0)) ( (2.510 (1 0)p · )) 0.92− − =+ . These results confirm that ambiguous signals 
are related to more uncertainty and variability in participants’ choices. 
 
Willingness to pay for advice 
Our model assumes that the willingness to pay a particular price for an additional hour 
with the adviser depends on the actual price charged, several characteristics of the participant, as 
well as the participant’s posterior belief about this adviser. 
Table 4 shows that parameters here have the expected signs but some have credible 
intervals that include zero. The impact of price is negative with a mode of -0.085 and a 95% CI 
interval that does not include zero. On the other hand, the impact of the posterior belief about the 
adviser is positive (18.309) with the associated 95% CI also not including zero. Of the remaining 
participant characteristics, the only parameter with a CI that does not include zero is the indicator 
for whether the participant has paid for financial advice in the past. The mode of this parameter 
is positive at 0.466 with a 95% CI of [0.348, 0.570] and we conclude that participants who have 
paid for advice in the past are more willing to pay than those who have not. 
 Based on these parameters and Equation (7) it is possible to calculate the associated 
price difference price price pricenew old∆ = −   that a participant is willing to pay for a specific 
difference in posterior beliefs belief belief beliefnew old∆ = − , namely  
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(9) 
posterior
2
price
2
price · belief·100,β
β
∆ = − ∆   
 where the multiplication with 100 is necessary because the price was divided by 100 before 
entering the estimation. We can use this formula to calculate the additional dollar amount that 
participants are willing to pay for their preferred adviser. Based on the posterior distribution of 
the estimates, we obtain additional willingness to pay estimates that have a mean of $1722 with 
the lower bound of the 95% CI equal to $189 and the upper bound equal to $4639.  
 
Rational versus FHJ updating 
Our model shows that a 62.9% of participants exhibit confirmation bias. In our setup, we 
use participants’ conscientiousness and impulsiveness to explain which participants are more 
likely to display confirmation bias. Table 4 shows that participants with high impulsiveness are 
less likely to be rational updaters (mode of -0.3445, the 95% CI does not include zero). This 
parameter implies that more impulsive participants are more likely to interpret ambiguous signals 
as a confirmation of their prior belief.  In contrast, high conscientiousness has a positive mode 
(0.243) but the 95% CI does include zero.   
 
Clarity of topics 
In our model, we assume that whether a topic is perceived as clear or ambiguous by a 
participant depends on the participant’s characteristics as well as on the topic itself. More 
specifically, we find that participants with more expertise are more discerning. Results show that 
participants with high knowledge of the financial products related to the advice, high financial 
literacy and high numeracy are more likely to perceive a topic as clear. For all these variables, 
the modes of the posterior distributions are positive and the 95% CIs do not contain zero. Gender 
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and participants’ age also affect whether a topic is perceived as clear versus ambiguous: female 
participants are significantly more likely to perceive a topic as clear and so are participants who 
are 40 years or older. In addition, the size and sign of the topic-specific constants is in line with 
the share of correct answers for these topics. The advice related to index fund fees is perceived as 
significantly more difficult than all other topics since the associated 95% CI does not overlap 
with the CI of any other topic. 
Table 5 reports the percentage of participants who belong to each of the 16 possible 
clarity classes. For example, 18.2% of participants perceive all topics to be clear; 3.8% of 
participants perceive all topics to be ambiguous; and 21.9% of participants struggle to understand 
advice on index fund fees even though all other topics are clear to them.   
INSERT Table 5 ABOUT HERE 
Illustration of Model Implications 
Our model allows us to compare the impact of the participants’ two different updating 
strategies on their choices. It additionally allows us to measure the impact of first impressions on 
subsequent choices. To illustrate, consider two participants A and B who update their beliefs 
according to the rational and biased updating scheme, respectively. Let the right adviser (R) 
display a certification and the left adviser (L) not display a certification. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the participants distrust financial advisers, we set other characteristics 
at the medians of the survey sample distributions,  and we fix estimated parameters at the mode 
of the posterior distributions. Both participants will thus have the same prior belief about the 
right (R) and the left (L) adviser of 0 0
exp(1.728 0.085 520)
1 exp(1.728 0.085
0.7
520)
85R RA Bλ λ
+ −
== =
+ + −
 and 
0 0
exp(1.728 0.085 0.520)
1 exp(1.728 0.085
0.75
0.520)
5L LA Bλ λ
− −
= =
+ − −
= . Assume that Adviser R gives good advice on 
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a clear topic in the first choice set and that both advisers give (from the client’s perspective) 
ambiguous advice in the remaining three choice sets.  
Table 6 shows how the updated prior beliefs, choice probabilities for the advisers in each 
choice set evolve in this scenario. Both clients update their beliefs in the same way at the first 
choice because they get clear information about adviser quality. Participant A’s beliefs about the 
advisers, as well as the associated choice probabilities, remain the same throughout the later 
three choice sets as this participant simply ignores the ambiguous information and ends the 
experiment still favoring Adviser R. In contrast, Participant B interprets all new information in 
line with current beliefs, so this participant will treat all ambiguous information as evidence that 
Adviser R is good and that Adviser L is bad. Thus, Participant B’s updated beliefs about Adviser 
R rise steadily and so does his or her probability of choosing Adviser R.  
INSERT Table 6 ABOUT HERE 
The table thus shows that FHJ updating leads to a choice probability that is very close to 
one for Adviser R and close to zero for Adviser L, while the same probabilities are 0.9 (Adviser 
R) and 0.1 (Adviser L) for the rational updater. It also shows the difference a first impression 
makes. An early clear signal has a stronger influence on the FHJ updater, whose opinion 
approaches certainty over few choices. Combined with Equation (13), the results in Table  allow 
us to calculate the monetary value of a first impression. While both consumers are willing to pay 
$176 more for Adviser R after the first piece of advice has been given, this amount rises by 18% 
to $214 after all four pieces for the FHJ updater whereas it stays constant for the rational updater.  
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
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Using a unique discrete choice experiment, this paper contributes to both the financial 
advice and behavioral finance literature by measuring the economic consequences of two 
common biases on clients’ willingness to pay for financial advisers. To our knowledge, this is 
the first time this has been done. Our model puts a dollar value on differences in first 
impressions, as well as on differences in updating schemes, and demonstrates that ignoring 
confirmation bias will underestimate the impact of first impressions. More specifically, we show 
that, although immediately after the first impression the willingness to pay is the same for the 
rational and the biased learner, three additional pieces of ambiguous information can lead the 
biased learner to be willing to pay 18% more than their rational counterpart. 
Furthermore, our results show that it is too strong to assume that all learners apply 
rational Bayesian methods when they receive and process signals of attribute quality. However, 
to our knowledge, we are the first to show, in a financial context, how many consumers are 
actually failing to update in a rational way. Utilizing the learning model developed by Fryer et. 
al. (forthcoming), we find that almost two thirds of participants in our experiment did not use the 
commonly assumed rational method, instead they made choices consistent with the FHJ model, a 
limited memory updating process where people use unclear signals to confirm and reinforce their 
current beliefs. This significant percentage is consistent with Fryer et al.’s (forthcoming) 
experimental test examining how opinions related to public policy issues are formed.   Our 
experiment also presents evidence that people who are unsure of how to interpret the signals they 
receive and who do not ignore them, not only end up with strongly biased beliefs, but will spend 
accordingly. We also demonstrate how polarizing opinions about financial advisers can result, 
even when consumers are given identical signals but start with different priors. 
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Our research provides a glimpse into the type of decision maker that is more prone to 
become a biased updater.  By using participant characteristics to predict the probability of using 
rational versus FHJ updating, we show that particularly impulsive people are more likely to 
suffer financially from the information processing bias. Also, our model segments decision 
makers by their updating strategies. This information has many potential applications for 
companies. For example, companies can gain valuable insight into how customer segment(s) are 
likely to respond to new information, based on their prior beliefs, either towards more moderate 
or more polarized preferences.  
In the context of financial advice, our model provides useful insights for financial 
advisers and public policy. For the former, we show that displaying recognizable professional 
certifications has a significant positive impact on first impressions which then filters through to a 
higher chance that clients will accept advice and a higher willingness to pay for additional 
advice. Thus, advisers should assess the costs of gaining a qualification in the light of these 
possible future gains. The implications for public policy are even more interesting:  regulators 
should consider how advisers are able to use credentials to increase their pay. If credentials are  
signals of superior service and recommendations, then credentials can provide helpful 
information to the consumer. However, many different certifications of varying quality may be 
available to advisers. Future research could study more extensively whether clients can 
distinguish among the many credentials available and whether the quality of the designation is 
properly incorporated into clients’ willingness to pay for advisers. If not, regulators should 
consider whether they should limit the designations available to those meeting certain criteria. In 
addition, while current research emphasizes improvements to financial literacy to encourage 
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sensible financial decisions, our model shows that less impulsivity can also increase client 
welfare. Thus, our model proposes another potentially important lever. 
Finally, our results could stimulate research into learning models that account for 
behavioral tendencies, so as to capture how people with limited financial knowledge approach 
decision making. One possible modification of our model involves the updating strategies. That 
is, we assume that participants are either purely FHJ or purely rational updaters so they interpret 
ambiguous signals as exactly confirming their prior belief (FHJ updating) or as not being 
informative at all (rational updating). It is possible that participants interpret ambiguous signals 
as only partly confirming their priors, meaning that there is a continuum between extreme 
updating processes.  
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Table 1: Financial Advice Script 
This table reports the scripts for the four advice topics used in the choice experiment. Participants make four choices in total, one for each advice topic, with topic 
orders following the experimental design shown in Table 3. Advice is delivered to participants in videos. Each choice set begins with a narrator’s introduction, 
then two advisers provide identical advice (the underlined advice) at the beginning of their talk and then divergent advice at the end (the italicized part). After 
participants have viewed both advisers’ videos, they choose which adviser they would follow, and proceed to the next topic. 
Narrator Introduction Advice Narrator Introduction Advice 
Paying Down Debt 
In this scenario, you have 
accumulated some large 
outstanding credit card debt with a 
high associated interest rate. 
Recently, you have inherited some 
money unexpectedly and would like 
to know what to do with it.  The 
next 2 financial advisers will 
recommend what you should do. 
 
 
Good Advice: I understand that you have 
some large credit card debt but recently 
inherited money. It is important to think 
about your overall financial position when 
making a decision about what to do. It is 
easy to simply save this big sum of money in 
a savings account to achieve a savings goal, 
but the interest gained is far smaller than the 
high interest expense of not paying down 
your credit card debt. Therefore, I 
recommend you pay off your credit card debt 
to eliminate the high interest charges. 
Choosing an Index 
Fund 
In this scenario, you are 
thinking about investing 
in a managed share 
index fund.  The next 2 
financial advisers will 
recommend what you 
should do about it. 
 
Good Advice: I understand you need help 
regarding your choice of share index fund. 
Did you know that all share index funds 
invest with the aim of matching the overall 
share market return? These various share 
index funds provide an almost identical 
product so why pay a fund manager more 
than the others for the same thing. 
Therefore, I recommend that you choose the 
share index fund with the lowest 
management fees. 
Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above] It is 
hard to save big sums of money so it is 
important to think about your special savings 
goals when making this decision. Therefore, 
I recommend you ignore your credit card 
debt for now and put your inheritance in a 
separate savings account.  
 Bad Advice [Insert underlined above] but 
some fund managers have better reputations 
than others and you get what you pay for. 
Therefore, I recommend that you avoid the 
share index funds with low management 
fees.    
Consolidating Retirement 
Accounts 
In this scenario, suppose you have 
just changed jobs and started a new 
superannuation account. Currently, 
you already have two other 
superannuation accounts from past 
jobs. The next 2 financial advisers 
will recommend what you should 
do about it. 
Good Advice: I see that you have three 
superannuation accounts with different super 
funds. Did you know that people are 
typically charged regular fixed 
administration fees on all of these 
superannuation accounts? As a result, I 
recommend that you roll all of these 
accounts together so you are not paying 
extra fees.  
Diversifying a Stock 
Portfolio 
In this scenario, you are 
thinking about investing 
in the share market.  
The next 2 financial 
advisers will 
recommend what you 
should do about it. 
Good Advice: I understand you need help 
regarding how to invest your superannuation 
money. Did you know money invested in 
shares can go up and down? It is good to try 
to balance out the shares that go up with the 
shares that go down. Therefore, I 
recommend that you spread your money 
across a variety of shares in different types 
of companies and industries. 
Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above]  
Despite that, I recommend that you not roll 
all of these accounts together so you are 
diversified across different superannuation 
funds. 
 Bad Advice: [Insert underlined above] That 
is why it is good to invest in something you 
know and can easily monitor. Therefore, I 
recommend that you invest your money in 
one blue chip company. 
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Table 2: Variable description 
This table reports definitions of variables used in the estimation of choice model (eqn 13) where Xi are vectors of 
explanatory variables for the components of the model (eqns , consisting of elements shown by “x” in the 
corresponding column). Variables are computed from responses to an online survey of a representative sample of 
2003 Australian adults conducted in December 2014.  
  
 Variable Name X0 X3 X4 X5 Description 
       
 Constant x x x x Constant; topic specific for X5 
 Adviser characteristics     
 
 Displays NO credential x    Indicator variable that equals 1 if only adviser’s name was 
displayed and -1 when “Certified Financial Planner” and 
adviser’s name was displayed. 
 Price  x   Price in $ (divided by 100) for one additional hour with this 
adviser 
 Posterior  x   Posterior belief about adviser after advice on all four topics 
has been provided – estimated within the model 
 Advice      
 
 Good advice      Indicator variable that equals 1 if the wrong advice was given 
in the particular choice set, -1 otherwise. Enters the model via 
the choice specification in Equation (5) 
 Topic: Account consolidation    x Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was account 
consolidation, 0 otherwise. 
 Topic: Stock diversification    x Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was stock 
diversification, 0 otherwise. 
 Topic: Index fund fee    x Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was index fund 
management fees, 0 otherwise. 
 Topic: Debt repayment    x Indicator variable that equals 1 if the topic was debt 
repayment, 0 otherwise. 
 Participant characteristics 
 Participant female     x An indicator variable that equals 2 if the participant is a 
female, 1 otherwise. 
 Participant older than 39 years    x An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant is a older 
than 39 years, 0 otherwise. 
 Trust in advisers x    An indicator variable that equals 1  if the participant reported 
general trust in financial advisers, -1 if distrust,  0 otherwise 
 
 Paid for advice  x   Indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant has ever paid 
for financial advice, -1 if they have not 
 Household income  x   Household income ($’000, mean centered) 
 Confidence in financial decisions  x   Indicator variable that equals 1 if participant has high 
confidence in their own ability to make financial decision, -1 
if low 
 Financial risk tolerance  x   Indicator variable that equals 1 if participant’s risk tolerance 
is high and -1 if low 
 Decision maker  x   Indicator variable that equals 1 when the participant is most 
responsible for financial decisions, 0 when jointly responsible 
and -1 when someone else is responsible. 
 Financial literacy    x An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct 
percentage on four financial literacy questions is above the 
sample median, 0 otherwise. Questions test simple interest, 
inflation, diversification, and compound interest. 
 Numeracy    x An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct 
percentage on three numeracy questions is above the sample 
median, 0 otherwise. Questions test fractions, percentages 
and probabilities. 
 Product knowledge    x An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s correct 
percentage on four financial product questions is above the 
sample median, 0 otherwise. Questions test topics used in 
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advice experiment: debt, index funds, account consolidation, 
diversification. 
 Conscientiousness   x 
 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s 
conscientiousness is above the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
Participants rated themselves as organized, responsible, 
hardworking and careless (reverse coded) on a four-point 
scale. Ratings are averaged. 
 Impulsiveness   x 
 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s 
impulsiveness is above the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
Participants rated themselves as buying too much, buying 
impulsively, buying without planning, and/or buying 
unnecessarily on a five point scale. Ratings are averaged. 
 Market experience    x An indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant’s 
percentage on owning four financial securities is above the 
sample median, 0 otherwise. Participants reported whether 
they owned a credit card (debt), units in an index fund (fees), 
a superannuation account (consolidation) and stocks 
(diversification). 
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Table 3: Experimental design 
This table shows the structure of the experiment. Each participant in the experiment makes four choices of financial 
advice where the design of the four choice sets consists of: one row from Panel A (adviser characteristics); one row 
from Panel B (sequence of advice topics); and one row from Panel C (sequence of delivery of good or bad advice 
from Adviser 1 and Adviser 2). Panel A shows the combinations of adviser characteristics: each pair of advisers 
consisted of an adviser with a triple (gender, age, certification) and an adviser with its reverse. Adviser 1 appeared 
on the left-hand side of the choice set screen and Adviser 2 appeared on the right-hand side. Each participant saw the 
same two advisers for the entire experiment and each adviser stayed on the same side of the screen throughout the 
experiment. Panel B shows the sequence of advice topics for each condition in the experiment where “E” stands for 
one of the easy topics (debt and account consolidation) and “H” stands for one of the hard topics (fees and 
diversification). Panel C shows the eight sequences of advice quality for each condition in the experiment where 
“G” stands for good advice, while “B” stands for bad advice. 
 
  Panel A.  Design of adviser pairs 
 Adviser 1  Adviser 2  
Pair Gender Age Certification  Gender Age Certification  
1 Female Young Yes  Male  Old No 
2 Female Old No  Male Young Yes 
3 Male Young No   Female Old Yes 
4 Male Old Yes  Female Young No 
 
Panel B. Sequence of advice topics 
Sequence Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 Clarity 
1 Diversification Fees Consolidation Debt HHEE 
2 Consolidation Debt Diversification Fees EEHH 
3 Diversification  Consolidation Fees Debt HEHE 
4 Consolidation Diversification Debt Fees EHEH 
5 Diversification Consolidation Debt Fees HEEH 
6 Consolidation Diversification Fees Debt EHHE 
 
Panel C. Design of the sequence of advice quality 
 Advice from adviser 1  Advice from adviser 2 
Quality 
Sequence 1
st topic 2nd topic 3rd topic 4th topic  1st topic 2nd topic 3rd topic 4th topic 
1 G G B B  B B G G 
2 G B G B  B G B G 
3 G B B G  B G G B 
4 B G G B  G B B G 
5 B G B G  G B G B 
6 B B G G  G G B B 
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Table 4: Empirical Results 
This table reports statistics from the posterior distributions of estimated parameters of the choice model (eqn 13). 
Data are survey responses of 2003 participants collected in December 2014. Variables are defined in Table 2. For 
each parameter, we report the mode of its posterior distribution as well as the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of this 
distribution, i.e., the equi-tailed credible interval (CI). There is a 95% probability that the parameter is not zero if 
zero does not fall in the CI. Estimation was conducted using SABL; see Appendix B for details. 
 
 Mode 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile 
 Prior belief about adviser, Eq. (4)    
Trust in financial advisers 0.520 0.421 0.610 
Displays NO credential -0.085 -0.199 -0.009 
    Constant 1.728 1.511 1.903 
Choice of Advice, Eqs. (5) & (6)    
Quality ( 1β )  4.296 3.599 5.060 
Posterior belief ( 2β ) 2.510 1.494 3.622 
Willingness to pay, Eq. (7)    
Constant -7.782 -9.687 -6.228 
Price  -0.085 -0.124 -0.043 
Posterior 18.309 14.808 22.230 
Paid for advice 0.466 0.348 0.570 
Household income 0.094 -0.021 0.163 
Confidence in financial decisions -0.088 -0.186 0.051 
Financial risk tolerance 0.055 -0.047 0.156 
Decision maker 0.034 -0.125 0.186 
Rational vs FHJ updating, Eq. (9)    
Constant -0.454 -0.994 -0.185 
High Conscientiousness 0.243 -0.046 0.485 
High Impulsiveness -0.344 -0.724 -0.154 
Clarity of Topics, Eq. (10)    
High Market Experience 0.073 -0.046. 0.151 
High Product Knowledge 0.267 0.171 0.358 
Participant older than 39 0.554 0.441 0.646 
Participant female 0.138 0.053 0.237 
High Financial Literacy 0.372 0.244 0.458 
High Numeracy 0.357 0.278 0.482 
Consolidation 1.405 1.148 1.632 
Diversification 0.615 0.395 0.814 
Fees -0.545 -0.794 -0.358 
Debt 1.768 1.511 1.995 
Estimated % of participants using rational learning: 37.11; limited memory learning: 62.89. 
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Table 5: Proportion of participants in latent classes of clear and ambiguous advice topics. 
This table shows estimated posterior proportion of participants assigned to 16 latent classes differentiated by clarity 
or ambiguity of the four advice topics: account consolidation (column 1), diversification (column 2), index fund fees 
(column 3), and debt (column 4). A “1” indicates that participants in that class treated the topic as clear and “0” 
indicates that they treat the topic as ambiguous.  For example, the model assigns 18.2% of participants to latent class 
1 (row 1) that treats all topics as clear, and assigns 3.8% of participants to latent class 16 (row 16) that treats all 
topics as ambiguous. We infer latent classes from estimation of the choice model (eqn 13) – see Table 4 for 
estimation results.  
 
Latent class Consolidation Diversification Fees Debt Segment Size 
1 1 1 1 1 18.2 
2 1 1 1 0 2.2 
3 1 1 0 1 21.9 
4 1 1 0 0 4.5 
5 1 0 1 1 6.9 
6 1 0 1 0 1.4 
7 1 0 0 1 14.0 
8 1 0 0 0 4.8 
9 0 1 1 1 3.1 
10 0 1 1 0 0.6 
11 0 1 0 1 6.4 
12 0 1 0 0 2.3 
13 0 0 1 1 2.0 
14 0 0 1 0 0.7 
15 0 0 0 1 7.2 
16 0 0 0 0 3.8 
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Table 6: Evolution of beliefs with one clear and three ambiguous topics. 
This table compares the effects of first impressions on subsequent choices when clients use either rational (standard 
Bayesian) or FHJ (limited memory) to update beliefs about adviser quality. The example assumes client A uses 
rational updating and client B uses FHJ updating, that both clients are initially distrusting of financial advisers, and 
that otherwise both clients have characteristics at the medians of the sample distributions. Parameters are set to the 
modes of the posterior distributions. Adviser R shows a professional certification and Adviser L does not. Both 
participants thus have the same prior beliefs that the right (R) and the left (L) adviser are of good quality, λ0.  
Adviser R delivers good advice on a clear topic at choice 1 but topics 2-4 are ambiguous to both clients. Both clients 
update their beliefs in the same way at the first choice because they get clear information about adviser quality λ1. 
Client A’s beliefs about the advisers 2 4( )λ λ− , and choice probabilities, 2 41) tPr( Pro 1( )y y= = , remain 
constant because the rational client does not update using ambiguous signals. Client B treats ambiguous information 
as evidence in favor of his or her priors and continues to update in favor of Adviser R. 
 
 
0λ   1Pr( 1)y =   1λ  2Pr( 1)y =    3Pr( 1)y =  3λ  4Pr( 1)y =  4λ  
          
Adviser R, 
client A 
0.785 0.987 0.916 0.886 0.916 0. 886 0.916 0. 886 0.916 
Adviser R, 
client B 
0.785 0.987 0.916 0.886 0.970 0.913 0.990 0.921 0.997 
Adviser L, 
client A 
0.755 0.013 0.098 0.114 0.098 0. 114 0.098 0. 114 0.098 
Adviser L, 
client B 
0.755 0.013 0.098 0.114 0.035 0.087 0.012 0.079 0.004 
 prior belief about adviser quality at choice set i iλ = ; 
1)  probability of choosing to follow advice of adviser at choicePr(  set iy i= =  
 
45 
 
 
Figure 1: Simulation of belief updating 
This figure illustrates all possible paths of beliefs about the probability that an adviser is of good quality for experimental “clients” under different assumptions 
about initial prior probabilities of good quality and updating strategies (in rows). Larger dots indicate a higher proportion of all possible updating paths that pass 
through each point. We set the probability that a good adviser offers a good signal, s, to 0.75. Rows 1, 3 and 4 reflect limited memory (FHJ or “Fryer”) updating 
with starting priors λ0 of 0.6, 0.5, and 0.4, respectively. Row 2 reflects rational updating where prior λ0 = 0.5. Columns 1-5 show belief paths where 4, 3, 2, 1, and 
0 advice topics are clear to clients. At column 1 (all topics clear), difference between paths come from different sequences of good and bad advice. As more 
topics become ambiguous difference between paths additionally come from different sequences of clear and ambiguous signals. FHJ updating leads to increasing 
polarization. Rational clients do not update their priors if all signals are ambiguous (column 5, row 2).  FHJ updaters also do not update when all signals are 
ambiguous and their starting prior is equal to 0.5 (row 3, column 5).   
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Figure 2: Discontinuities in likelihood function under FHJ updating 
This figure shows proportion of theoretical belief paths reaching updated prior beliefs, λ4, after four signals from advisers to experimental clients who use either 
rational or FHJ (“Fryer”) updating. Rows show simulations for three arbitrary values of the signal strength parameter s, that is, the probability that a good adviser 
delivers good advice. For each value of the initial prior belief that an adviser is good, λ0 (horizontal axes), we draw all possible values of posterior beliefs that an 
adviser is good after four signals, λ4 (vertical axes), supported by the model. Paths vary by the pattern of clear or ambiguous signals delivered by the adviser. 
Larger circles indicate that more possible paths lead to any specific value of λ4. For example, in row 1 and column 2, at a signal strength of s=0.75 and where all 
participants use FHJ updating, as λ0 moves from 0.49 to 0.51, λ4 jumps from mostly less than 0.1, to mostly larger than 0.8, creating a discontinuous likelihood 
function. 
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Figure 3: Advisers 
This figure shows screen shots of four “advisers” who delivered video advice in the experiment. Each participant in 
the experiment viewed advice delivered by two of the four advisers as matched pairs of gender, age and certification 
opposites (e.g., young, male, certified v. older, female, not certified).  
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Appendix A: Demographics – comparisons between survey sample and Australian population (18-79 years), 2011 Census. 
This table compares demographics of sample of 2003 participants drawn from a nationally representative online panel by email invitation in 2014 with 2011 
(most recent) Australian census.   
 
Survey 
Participant 
Sample 
18-79 yrs 
Australian 
Population   
Survey 
Participant 
Sample 
18-79 yrs 
Australian 
Population 
Gender     Marital Status    
Male 50% 49%  Never Married 26% 30% 
Female 50% 51%  Divorced/ Separated 10% 13% 
Age     Widowed 2% 3% 
18-24 years 8% 10%  Married or long term relationship 62% 54% 
25-29 years 8% 10%  Personal Income    
30-34 years 12% 10%  $1-$20,799 (i.e. less than $399 a week) 24% 25% 
35-39 years  12% 10%  $20,800-$51,999 (i.e. $400-$999 a week) 35% 32% 
40-44 years 12% 10%  $52,000-$103,999 (i.e. $1,000-$1,999 a week) 25% 23% 
45-49 years 9% 10%  $101,000 (i.e. $2,000 a week) or more 7% 7% 
50-54 years 12% 10%  Negative or Nil Income 9% 6% 
55-59 years 12% 9%  Not Started 0% 7% 
60-64 years 13% 8%  Highest Level of Education    
65-69 years 2% 6%  High School or Less 26% 40% 
70-79 years 0% 8%  Vocational/Technical certificate 21% 20% 
Work Status     Tertiary diploma 11% 9% 
Employed 62% 63%  Bachelor degree 23% 15% 
Unemployed 8% 3%  Graduate certificate, diploma or degree 19% 6% 
Not in the labour force 18% 29%  Not stated 0% 10% 
Retired 12% not broken out     
Not stated 0% 5%     
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Appendix B: Sequential Adaptive Bayesian Learning Estimation 
 
The discontinuities in the likelihood function of our model cause implementation 
problems due to the inherent computational difficulty for maximum likelihood estimators (see 
also Chernozhukov and Hong 2004). We overcome these difficulties with Bayesian estimation 
methods. More specifically, we use Sequential Adaptive Bayesian Learning (SABL) proposed by 
Durham and Geweke (2014). SABL is an extension of sequential Monte Carlo methods that 
additionally exploits the benefits of parallel computing environments.  SABL does not require 
the modeler to specify conjugate priors and it is also robust to multimodal posteriors which can 
arise in high dimensional problems (Jasra et al. 2007) such as ours. When used for Bayesian 
inference, SABL is a posterior simulator. Our interest only lies in the latter; thus we focus the 
following basic description of SABL on this while also ignoring the aspects that make SABL an 
efficient tool to address very complex problems.  
As with any Bayesian estimation approach SABL requires the user to specify the 
likelihood function )(l θ as well as prior distributions (0) ( )p θ  for the parameters to be estimated. 
SABL then produces draws from the posterior * )(p θ  as follows: 
• Draw parameters from the prior distributions. To do this SABL 
represents initial information by (0) (0) ( )~iih dg pθ θ , organized into H groups10 of G 
draws each (SABL defaults to H=16 and G=192).  Let (0) )(p θ be a very flat 
version of the likelihood function, i.e. 0(0) ) )( ( rp lθ θ=  with 0r  very small. 
• For a sequence of cycles n=1, 2,.. 
                                                     
10 SABL organizes the draws into groups to exploit the parallel processing possibilities of the algorithm. 
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a. Correction (C) phase: Determine ( ) )(np θ by raising the 
likelihood function to a higher power, i.e. ( ) ) )( ( nrnp lθ θ= with 1n nr r −> . 
Calculate for each draw a weight ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ) ( ) / ( )n n n n n ngh gh ghp pw θ θ θ
− − − −= , 
h=1,…,H, g=1,…,G;  
b. Selection (S) phase, applied independently to each group 
h=1,..,H: Use multinomial residual resampling (e.g. Douc and Cappé 
2005) based on ( ) ( ), ,.., }{ 1n gh gw Gθ =  to select  
( ,0){ , 1,..., }ngh g Gθ =  out of 
( 1) , 1,..., }{ ngh i Iθ
− = . 
c. Mutation (M) phase, applied independently to each group 
h=1,..,H: The M phase is a Metropolis random walk. In each step o (o>0) 
of the random walk obtain for each g=1,…,G a proposal ( , )*n oghθ  is drawn 
from ( , 1) ( , 1),( )n o n oghN θ
− −Σ , where ( , 1)n o−Σ  is proportional to the sample 
variance of the particles ( , ) ,{ 1,..., }n ogh g Gθ = . Accept 
( , )*n o
ghθ  with 
probability α where α  is defined as 
(0) ( , )* ( , )* (0) ( , 1) ( , 1)min{1, ( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )}n o n o n o n ogh gh gh ghp l p lα θ θ θ θ
− −=  and set 
( , ) ( , )*n o n o
gh ghθ θ= , otherwise set 
( , ) ( , 1)n o n o
gh ghθ θ
−= . The proportionality factor is 
thereby increased when the rate of accepting the proposal draws is higher 
than a particular threshold (the default in SABL is 0.25), and decreases 
otherwise.  The random walk terminates once the dependence among 
particles has been sufficiently broken, that is when the particles are 
sufficiently independent (note that the S-phase introduces dependence via 
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repeated sampling of the same ( 1)nghθ
− ). SABL assumes sufficient 
independence of the particles when the variance (calculated across the H 
group means) falls below a certain threshold. The last set of  ( , )n oghθ  is then 
denoted as ( )nghθ . 
• If ( ) ) )( (np lθ θ= then N=n and the algorithm terminates with draws 
( )N
ghθ  from the posterior distribution * )(p θ . 
 
We chose uninformative priors. We assumed that the prior for each parameter of interest 
is independent normal with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of five. We evaluated the 
sensitivity of prior influence by a careful visual examination of the posterior distribution against 
the prior distribution. 
The advantage of using SABL (or a Bayesian approach in general) is that the posterior 
distribution of draws can help in assessing the identification of the model parameters (see also 
discussion in the previous section). More specifically, a high correlation between the posterior 
draws of two parameters may suggest that these are not separately identified by the choice data. 
In addition to including different covariates in the different model parts (see also discussion in 
section  4) and specifying different uninformative priors, we used this correlation matrix check to 
further assess the identification of our model.11   
 
                                                     
11 We run SABL using its MATLAB interface. SABL itself can be downloaded from 
http://www.quantosanalytics.org/garland/mp-sps_1.1.zip. The time to estimate our model using SABL is 
approximately 60 minutes. 
